She grasped her shoulders, wiggled her fingers and shivered - a mimed expression of fear. "My parents just tell me not to go near people like this so I stay away." I was new here, a wealthy, busy city on China's east coast and I wanted to interview a local street vendor, an elderly woman who sleeps under the roadway. I was looking for a translator. Zhang, a wealthy young business owner, suggested her friend who had just quit her job. But when I met them at Zhang's coffee shop, I was surprised to learn how unwilling some well-to-do urbanites here are to engage with poor migrants from the countryside - in this case a grandmother who sells furniture from a cart and sleeps on the sidewalk.
"In China people are scared to get involved with them. They are dangerous." Had these conclusions ever been tested? She ignored my question and waved a hand to evoke distant environs. "If you want to meet poor people you should go out there. I just believe it is some people's luck to be rich and some to be poor."
The People's Republic of China was founded upon the theoretical framework of "Marxism-Leninism applied and developed in China."1 After Mao's death, China's leadership began to chart a radically new course for the nation, which included dismantling some of the utopia that he had tried to create. The great rewards of this effort (one study found that average life expectancy in China had almost doubled between 1950 and 20112) as well as lingering contradictions are apparent in the China of today. Those who are enabled to navigate China's new economic terrain are growing increasingly rich,3 while others have seen their aspirations frustrated by conditions that have their very roots in the classless utopia envisioned by Mao.
Chen Xue Zhen is eighty-three years old. She sells furniture from a large wheeled cart and has been sleeping under the elevated roadway, by her account, for about twenty years. Not everyone is as scared of her as the young lady I met at the cafe - others give her clothing, blankets and snacks. She sleeps on the sidewalk because “it's good for old women to sleep on a hard surface." She never drinks anything cold and claims to continue such physically demanding labor at her advanced age because she needs to “practice herself.”
Chen's desire not to be seen granting an interview is likely the result of a dependence on the good graces of the urban management police - chengguan - who are charged with enforcing the rule of law in public spaces in many Chinese cities. Operating a vendor's cart is illegal without a permit in most places and street vendors are sometimes arrested and their goods confiscated. While in Mao's time street peddlers may have sold things "on poles or mobile stands"4 today it is more common to find them working from electric bicycles and three-wheeled carts, packing up and shuffling away as the chengguan approach. An altercation between vendors and chengguan in Zhejiang province escalated into a mass confrontation in which four officers were themselves beaten to death.5
Chen Xue Zhen explained to me that the local chengguan treat her with respect and turn a blind eye to her small encampment. I understood her ending our interview as an effort to maintain a low profile. As she had told me earlier, "When the other vendors leave, I have to leave too. It doesn't look good to stay out here and I know it."
Hukou is a system of housing registration in which every citizen is registered to a single residence that is either "agricultural" (rural) or "non-agricultural" (urban). Chen Xue Zhen comes from a nearby rural area and is not likely to possess an urban hukou. This system was established in 1958 and functions as a form of internal migration control.6 Rural to urban migrants are able to travel and work in cities, but often unable to avail themselves of the housing, subsidized medical care, education, and other welfare available to their urban compatriots.
The unprecedented rural to urban migration that the policy discourages has actually been an important driver of China's economic growth as premier (and economist) Li Keqiang explained earlier this year.7 Urban administrations in some locales now offer hukou for purchase to highly educated and skilled migrants. This has effectively created a two-track migration system, with one path to urbanization for the rural elite and one for the poor and less educated.8 A black market for fake hukou documents also exists.9
This privileging of the urban population is in direct opposition to Maoist ideology. While Marx's theory of class struggle opposed a property-owning bourgeoisie with a proletariat that worked mostly in urban factories, for Mao the revolutionary base was the rural, agricultural class.10 Hukou's relevance and fairness continue to be debated and reforms are announced periodically.11 12 Still, the agricultural/non-agricultural divide remains and continues to operate as a type of institutionalized discrimination, directly limiting the economic competitiveness of hundreds of millions of people.
Hukou - which limits migration to China's wealthy urban centers - and chengguan - who are charged with maintaining orderly and lawful public spaces in the cities - are two very clear and obvious challenges to the efforts of some rural migrants like Chen to profit in China's urban centers. These are social policies that can be observed and debated, enacted or rescinded.
Ideal societies are not constructed from social policy alone, however. They must be believed in. Another powerful yet difficult to analyze form of state control is the rhetorical project of the "model worker." Through this effort, the CPC is able to instill in the citizenry a dedication to selfless toil and a firm identification with one's productive role. In the Mao era, this effort was directed to collective empowerment. In the current economic order, it has been harnessed for something completely different.
The model worker program was initiated in 1950.13 National and local model workers are nominated every five years to serve as moral exemplars. They are awarded medals and pensions and treated to banquets and sometimes even leisure tours. In the Mao era, they were represented in paintings that later appeared as mass-produced posters.
Elaborating on the dialectic of Hegel and Marx in the realm of human behavior, Mao conceived that the model worker's nearly super-human devotion to duty and selfless toil would be represented to the masses of ordinary workers and within the minds of each a contradiction would arise: 'They are like this (thesis), and I am like that (antithesis).' This contradiction would resolve itself in a new reality that would find the worker more closely emulating the model (synthesis). This process, at least in Mao's conception, would be repeated in a never-ending cycle of improvement.14 After Mao, this notion - that the productive capacity of every individual is infinitely perfectable - was paired with open economic competition.
Stories of model workers appear today in the official and semi-official press and across the growing public sphere of the internet, where their supposed accomplishments are sometimes derided by casual online critics. The types of narratives that are presented, and thus the types of behavior they are designed to create, however, have changed substantially from those of the planned economy era.15 Following other scholars of China's shift to capitalism, we might describe the former as a "Maoist" model worker, and the latter as a "Dengist" model worker [after the hero of China's economic opening, Deng Xiaoping].16
Shi Chuanxing was a human waste collector in Beijing when he was honored as a national model worker in 1959 and invited to meet president Liu Shaoqi. In a posthumous profile by the CPC People's Daily, Shi's wife recalled her husband's excitement and the accolades of the president: "For the work you do as a night-soil collector you are a true servant of the people. And as the the state president, I'm also a servant of the people." Shi was appointed to a local governmental advisory body and in 1964 became a deputy to a legislative advisory body, the National People's Congress.17 He also gave an address at the "National Conference of Heroes." Though he was later persecuted and died during the Cultural Revolution, his narrative lives on in many forms - text, image, cinema and even monument.18 Shi's work, like that of many models from the Mao era, was dirty, dangerous and humble.
The rhetorical strategy developed by Mao in the 1950's has since been adopted by local governments and corporations who award honors to top managers. Deng Yuanyang received the honor of "Xiamen's Model Worker" in 2014 from the CPC Xiamen Municipal Committee, according to the website of his company. Yuchei is a manufacturer of small to heavy-duty engines that has transitioned from state-owned enterprise to publicly-traded, foreign joint stock-venture corporation.19
An online profile explains that the awardee "works as head of the equipment repair and maintenance team of the production operation department in charge of the daily repair and maintenance of equipment. Over the six years, Deng has taken an active part in the company's minor reforms and made rational suggestions." The profile concludes by quantifying the energy saved by his efficiency-conscious approach to work.
The rhetorical thrust of the model worker project has thus been effectively re-directed. While model workers of the Mao era were sometimes injured or even handicapped through their super-human efforts at realizing a socialist society, Deng was honored in terms drawn directly from neo-classical economic analysis for his minor reforms and rational suggestions. The ideal of self-less toil lives on, but its goal is now more closely aligned to that of the Yuchai corporation.
A similar shift can be seen in another rhetorical sphere, in which the concept of solidarity (tuánjié 团结, most commonly encountered as a verb), was once a staple of revolutionary propaganda, but used here as a marketing slogan.
While this re-appropriation appears obvious and inelegant, the semiotic slippage of the model worker project is more subtle. China's new heroes are closer to the notion of a hustler, an independent economic agent who finds an accomodating niche in the economic order and operates according to the principles of profit. More commonly celebrated in the media today are China's growing ranks of industrialists. Their narratives of success contain all the fantastic elements of the heroes of the Mao era - unending struggle and a near complete sublimation of identity to realize their full productive capacity. This effort, however, is directed to the new ethos of private wealth accumulation.
Chen Xue Zhen's life has spanned this paradigm shift. Her strong identification with her productive role - developed in part through the thoughtwork of Mao-era propaganda - has adapted itself to the new economic realities of competition and private profit. She lives on the street because that also happens to be where her profits await. It was easy for me, having worked in homeless shelters in America, to read her life as very desperate. But she denied indigence at every turn. She's not a victim of circumstance. She has come here - like so many others, including myself - to seek her fortune.
Each interview has been translated and edited.
"I think this job gives me more freedom and it doesn't require me to be controlled by others. I don't like to work for other people and be tied down."
"I want to rely on my own ability to make my own money. Right? You know everyone has his or her dream. I want to have an artificial limb, but I don't earn enough money."
"I previously worked on construction sites, but I am old now. It’s not good for me to climb to high places. And, to be honest, after doing that for about thirty to forty years I began to feel sick of doing the same kind of job."
"I want to open a shop, but I have no money. Because rent takes a hundred thousand each year. If it were twenty or thirty thousand each year, then I could make that investment. But it costs so much money that I dare not do it."
Street vendors like Chen Xue Zhen are a regular sight in urban China and many of them are migrants. Though few are likely to sleep outside, many have made deep personal sacrifices to compete for wealth in the city. Among those I met here, some were recently displaced and some perpetually itinerant. Others were just giving city life a try.
It's striking that not a single respondent mentions hukou or other social policies explicitly when asked about inequality of wealth. They are more likely to either pronounce themselves unqualified to discuss the issue, or to explain it away through assumptions about one's fundamental ability to earn, their intelligence and their determination. Only a few mentioned connections to those in power and access to capital.
There are other jobs available to rural migrants in Chinese cities. Still, many of the vendors I met explained that they appreciate a certain independence - their profits redound entirely to themselves, though so does all of the financial and legal risk. Many told me they had purposely chosen this work instead of another job so they can operate on their own terms. Economic agency means having to compete with others for a livelihood. But it also means the possibility of being one's own master to the extent possible.
Are "informal economies" inherent to market-based societies? In the unique state market economy that has developed in China it seems almost inevitable that some people would imbibe and then try to implement the work ethic presented by the country's leadership and elite, legally or otherwise. Arguments continue to be made for hukou's reform on terms that support the bottom line, which is rapid and sustained national economic development.20 The world's largest experiment in socialism should offer an example of an economy based on competition that is not just efficient, but also fair. As its social and economic models begin to be emulated across the globe, China's leadership should seek to develop a form of market socialism that results not in a competition that becomes ever more fierce, but rather one in which all citizens can compete for wealth legally and on the most equal terms possible.
Plans for the nation's 13th five-year plan will be finalized in a few months. The central government should move beyond the outdated agricultural/non-agricultural categories and allow rural Chinese to compete for wealth on the same terms as their urban counterparts.